




The rich heritage of the concept of the 'primary group' is
accompanied by crippling ambiguity. An attempt is made to correct
the difficulty in two ways: 1) the primary group is regarded as a
social system; and 2) the irreducible element present in previous
definitions is held to be the affective bond between group members.
In the primary group affectivity is symbiotic, i.e., it implies
mutual dependency as well as shared feeling. Such a definition of
the concept allows the researcher to explore the dynamics of primary
relations such as groups in which some, but not all relations, are
primary (quasi-primary groups) and the dynamics of power-dependence
relations in primary groups.
Like many other popular SOCiological concepts, the term "primary group" has bee
subjected to extensive discussion designed to hone its analytical precision. These
definitional refinements were ensured by the vague and somewhat unsystematic nature
of Cooley's (1925) introduction to the concept, and the resulting contradictions in
sociological usage. Some of these discussions have attempted to clarify, through
explicit organization, Cooley's analysis (such attempts have tended toward funda-
mentalism, e.g., Jandy, 1942; Lee, 1964); others have tried to refine Cooley's
thought so the concept would more closely correspond to perceived social reality
(Faris, 1932), or be more easily amenable to operational definition (Bates and Bab-
chuk, 1961).
The Meaning of Primary
While each of these approaches has contributed to a growing awareness of the
importance of definitional rigor, conceptual efficiency rests upon broad and
systematic definition. For such definitions to develop, it is necessary not only fo]
the minimum criteria of internal logical consistency to be met, but concepts must
also be subject to the mortar of empirical utility and the pestle of theoretical
coherence and integration. To the extent that any of these criteria are slighted,
the emerging conception is inherently limited. This paper will attempt the develop-
ment of such a systematic and efficient conceptualization of the primary group.
Analytical discussions have frequently had as their focus the defining charac-
teristics of such a group. The evaluation of conceptual components was initiated by
Faris (1932), who suggested that since face-to-face interaction is neither necessary
nor sufficient grounds for determining whether a group is primary, that criterion
should be dissociated from the concept. Lee (1964) responded to Faris' analysis by
asserting that Faris had misinterpreted Cooley. Lee presented four properties of
primary groups designed to accurately reflect Cooley's original conception: (1)
temporal priority in experience; (2) personal and intimate association; (3) psycholo-
gical unity as expressed by the feeling of "we-ness"; and (4) dissemination and shari
of primary ideals. This final property represents, for both Cooley and Lee, an in-
trusion of personal values into sociological definition. Lee, for example, denies th
applicability of the concept to such diverse social groups as street gangs, insur-
rectionary political groups, and religious sects "engaging in emotional ecstasy"
because associational groups emerging within these structures fail to possess the fou
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properties. The latter, for instance, is "not based upon the genuine tenet of
Chr-Ls t Larri.ty" (1964:33). Since the property "dissemination and sharing of primary
ideals" is primarily a repository for such ethnocentrism, 'its value as a defining
characteristic is questionable. Similarly, while temporal priority appears to be
related to the concept, defining primary groups in t e rms of temporal priority blurs
meaningful distinctions between differential groups (e.g., familial verus peer).
Consideration of the thought of Babchuk and Bates (1961) allows a broader context
in which to evaluate the two remaining properties. Initial conceptualizations derive
their value only to the extent that they isolate a meaningful and useful aspect of
social reality. Recognition and application of this truism allow Bates and Babchuk
to develop a much more useful and incisive analysis than that of Lee. By identifying
four sociological variables (size, duration, frequency of contact, and homogeneity) as
predisposing factors, the authors are able to reduce the defining characteristics of
the primary group to two social-psychological variables: (1) member orientation toward
other members in activity; and (2) the affective aspect of member orientation. It
can be seen, however, that these two elements are interdependent. Specifically,
member orientation toward other members in activity, which implies a focus on the shared
relationship rather than the instrumental or expressive activity, is dependent upon
the affective association of the specific members. Similarly, from this perspective,
Lee's properties of personal, intimate association and psychological unity can be
seen to be emerging properties of groups characterized by mutual affective ties. Thus
the irreducible element in each definitional treatment appears to be the affective
bond between group members.
The Nature of Affectivity
Bates and Babchuk (1961) state, "A simple way of characterizing the emotional
quality of a primary group is to say that, over time, there is a strong predominance
of feelings of attraction between the members." Negative feelings will be present,
but they will "be outweighed by feelings and expressions of positive affect." This
treatment, while consistent with most sociological literature in affectivity, is
inadequate to the degree that it fails to consider the dynamics of affectivity.
Sinunel (1950) noted the "pure and immediate reciprocity" that characterizes the
dyad. Similarly, Bales and Borgotta (1965:502) state that in two-person groups,
"each person is under pressure to behave in such a way that the other will not with-
draw and will continue to cooperate even though he may have to yield a point at a
given time." Each of these observations, although not specifically focused on the
primary group, is congruent with Gouldner's (1960) view that behavior is guided by
a norm of reciprocity, and Homan's (1958) treatment of behavior as social exchange.
The reality of reciprocal interdependence doubtlessly extends into the arena of
primary relationships. Recognition of such interdependent influence does not negate
the point (emphasized by Bates and Babchuck) that primary relations are voluntary and
free from constraint; the consensus based on positive feelings discussed by Gross
(1956) is dominant in primary groups. Rather, what is implied is that symbiosis also
exists on the affective level.
To assert that affective dependence provides the penultimate basis for affective
relations does not imply the psychological reductionism that Winch's (1958) need-
complimentarity implies, although psychological factors must not be ignored. Rather,
affective symbiosis is seen as emerging from mutual dependence, where dependence ~­
plies that power or influence is operative in the relationship. Emerson (1962) makes
the point succinctly: "power resides implicitly in the other's dependency." The
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d d dinlens 1 0 n of affective relations has, for tne most part, been maskedpower- epen' ence ~ .' I • • •• •
l I . t I and conseIlsual context ~11 wh.l.ch ~t operates. Yet, the Ld ent.Lf Lca t Lon)yLl.epOSl~ve(; ."
[ t l L' L'; mans Lon llllows sys t ema t Lc treatment of p r i.mary r e.Lat Lons t ha t; depart from0, t. S u r, 1· lb·'
l t .j e exh;bit an unbalanced power-dependency re allon, a e1t 1nt'le pure ype, .L. ., ...... • • •
1 ~ f sit;ve attraction- a point which will be expanded In the d1Scusslontie contexL 0 po .L ,
to follow.
The Boundaries of a Primary Group
1 h " "Not only is the term "primary" subject to disagreement, but a so t e term. group.
As L (1064) has noted there is a tendency to use primary relations as the organizingee J, · 11 11. · d b
concept rather than primary group. Such a tendency is pragmat1ca. y ~rn~te ecause
it does not allow cons.ideration of groups of three or more that m~ght be accurately
defined as primary. On the other hand, Lee's response of excludin~ all dy~ds from
the category of primary groups does equal violence to,observed.soc~al.real~ty.
Even less flexible, and therefore less viable, is Lee s emphas~s on d~vergency
(i.e., heterogeneity) in primary groups.
If sociological definitions are, indeed, evaluated pragmatically, then the issue
of size is a secondary, almost artificial one. Systems (and the primary group can
be considered as a specific example) are differentiated from their environment on the
basis of their defining characteristic(s). Specifically, then, primary groups can be
defined as a system in which all members are bonded ~ ties £f mutual affective de-
pendence.
Realistically, as Kephart's (1950)formula of potential relationships implies, we
must anticipate that the likelihood of a group being primary (as determined by a formal
application of the definition) will be inversely related to group size. Further, as
Simmel (1950) and Bales and Borgotta (1965) have clearly shown, structural factors,
as well as the multiplication of relationships, gravitate against the creation of
larger primary groups. Thus, primary relations may be regarded as the basic units from
which larger groups may be constructed.
Discussion
The definition of primary group presented here is similar to many of the previous
usages; its strengths lie in (1) its explicitness, and (2) its emphasis on the internal
dynamics of the primary group. As with other usages, a determination can be made whether
a specific group meets the criteria of primariness; when the criteria are met, the
group can be compared and contrasted with non-primary groups. Of more interest, however,
are the insights into the differences '(I) within primary groups, and (2) between primary
and quasi-primary groups.
Primary Groups. In the first instance, primary groups where all members are, by
definition, mutually affectively dependent, may yet be characterized by differential
degrees of dependence, which leads to an unequal distribution of influence within the
group. It can be seen that unequal dependency within primary groups is hazardous to the
continued existence of the group. Bates and Babchuk have posited that in primary groups
there is no insistence on equivilence of exchange. However, to the degree that unequal
dependency exists, it may force the actor to reevaluate the group, and thereby question
its primary basis. Emerson's (1962) discussion of power-dependence relations, although
not unique to primary groups, is relevant. Emerson points out that for groups in which
dependency is not equalized (unbalanced relations), two kinds of balancing operations
are possible: (1) operations which increase the dependency of the super-ordinate
member; and (2) operations which decrease the dependency of the subordinate member.
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The type of operation employed will determine the continued existence of the group.
If the first type is operating, the group can be expected to continue at a higher
level of cohesion; when the second type of operation is used, the eventual dis-
solution of the relationship can be forecast.
Another facet of the internal dynamics of primary groups may be noted: the
power dependence aspect of affective relations gives rise to shared norms which
govern the nature of the relationship. As Thibaut and Kelley (1957:131) have stated,
"both weaker and stronger persons stand to gain from the introduction of mu t uaLl.y ac-
ceptable rules which introduce regularity and control into the relationship without
recourse to the direct interpersonal application of power. u The emergent normative
structure, which may be viewed as an extension and ritualization of the existing power-
dependence relationship, is a central facet of primary groups, and an appropriate
focus of primary group studies. Two concerns are paramount for such studies: (1)
the effects of differential no~ative 'structure within primary groups (e.g., the scope
of permissable activities); and (2) the impact that challeng1s to the normative structure
and changes in existing norms have within the primary group. Some of these concerns
have been explored in the context of small, task-oriented groups, but their dynamics
may be quite different ~n primary groups.
Quasi-primary groups. Traditionally, "primary group" has been treated as an
ideal-type, and contrasted with the concept of secondary group. It may be more
revealing, in specific empirical instances, to compare primary groups with groups
which, although not (formally) primary, contain many primary characteristics, and
thereby explore the effects which the defining characteristics have for the group.
The most prevalent example of such a group is the multi-person group where several
relations are primary, but one or more are not. Three specific instances of this
type will be discussed.
First is the instance of the friendship circle where one or more member pairs
do share a bond of affective dependency. This group possesses many aspects of the
primary group, and thus presents an interesting empirical contrast to the primary
group. Specifically, the distinction allows the researcher to compare: (1) the
no~ative structure, (2) the cohesiveness, (3) the dependence relations, and (4) the
stability of such a group with those of a primary group. Further, this instance
presents a different context in which to view balancing operations and other such
mechanisms. Such comparisons may provide insight into, not only the specific friend-
ship circle, but formal primary groups as well.
The second instance concerns the role of small children in a familial context.
While most sociologists recognize that not all families constitute primary groups,
the status of children in a cohesive family unit is less clear. Cooley appeared to
regard children primarily as inductees into the group, which served a socializing
function. In a sense, then, the temporal priority emphasized by Lee (1964) prohibits
the establishment of a primary group as defined here. Stated differently, the type
of family setting that is normally called a primary group might be better conceptualized
as a primary relationship (between the parents) which is open to the children when they
acquire sufficient social skills to enter relationships characterized by affectual
dependency. It may be noted that the heterogeneity of family members (in terms of
age, sex, and status) may decrease the likelihood of primary group formation if Bates
and Babchuk are correct in their treatment of homogeneity as a predisposing factor.
This example of a quasi-primary group, like the friendship circle, gives rise to a
1
Interpretive sociology has taken the lead in dealing with questions of this
nature. See Wilson, 1970.
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number of intriguing questions which can only be answered empirically. At what age
do children become capable of mutual affe~tive dependenty?' Is affective capability
in children related to the presence or absence of primary relat~ons between their
parents? How do pr.imary "groups" that serve a socializing function differ from those
emerging from peer relations? These and other questions suggest important unexplored
areas within the context of pr~ary groups.
TIle final instance is similar to the second; when can Cooley's "play group" be
formally classified as primary? Because children do not innately possess social skills,
emotional autonomy rather than affective dependency initially characterizes children's
play groups. It is clear, then, that early peer socialization must take place in the
context of what we have called quasi-primary groups. Analysis of this distinction
may have implications not only for students of primary groups, but for the area of
socialization as well.
Conclusion
The importance of the concept primary group is clearly established through the
process of fruitful usage. Previous conceptions, although disparate, provide the basis
for a redefinition of the concept based on logical consistency, empirical utility, and
the systematic introduction of related theory. The value of the emerging definition
lies in its capability to deal with empirical reality, and isolate new areas of
theoretical import. Specifically, from this perspective, insight may be gained re-
garding the internal dynamics of primary relations, the divergencies among types of
primary groups, and the functioning of formal primary groups vis-~-vis quasi-primary
groups. With regard to the latter, the role of children in a cohesive family is a
special case that can be examined in the context of primary group studies.
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